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THE TYRRELL WILLIAMS MEMORIAL
LECTURE
Tyrrell Williams served as an outstanding member of the Washington
University School of Law faculty from 1913 to 1946. The family and
friends of Tyrrell Williams established a lecture series in his honor in
1948. The Lectureship hasprovidedprominentjudges, legal scholars, and
practitioners with an opportunity to explore issues of the greatest sign~fi-
cance to the legal community.
The Honorable Wade H. McCree, Jr., distinguished jurist and public
servant, delivered the Tyrrell Williams Memorial Lecture on March 18,
1981, on the campus of Washington University in St. Louis, Missouri
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND HIS CLIENT
WADE H. McCREE, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a great pleasure to be with you today at Washington University,
and to participate in this distinguished lecture series. As Mr. Donohue
has explained to me, one of the purposes of the Tyrrell Williams lec-
tures is to explore the process by which our legal system converts its
general goals-such as preserving public order and promoting the wel-
fare of the people-into concrete reality. That, of course, is a large
topic. I would like to approach it cautiously, from the perspective of a
single government office, the Office of the Solicitor General. To this
end, I will share with you a few thoughts on how the Solicitor General
discharges his general statutory duty to "attend to the interests of the
United States"' in the federal courts. More specifically, I would like to
discuss how the Solicitor General gets along with his client-the
United States-and how he ascertains the "interests" of that client.
It is not uncommon, of course, for attorneys to encounter difficulties
* Solicitor General of the United States; A.B., 1941, Fisk University; LL.B., 1944 (1948),
LL.D., 1969, Harvard University.
I want to acknowledge the considerable assistance of Stephen M. Shapiro, Esq., one of my
assistants who assisted me with the draft and reviewed the manuscript.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 517-518 (1966).
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in communicating with their clients and in identifying their interests.
Corporate attorneys, for example, must contend with diverse personnel
and viewpoints in counselling the modern business firm, which is made
up of directors, officers, and employees, as well as individual and insti-
tutional stockholders. These problems are multiplied many fold when
the client is the federal government. To state the obvious, we are a
nation of more than 200 million people; our national government is
made up of legislative, executive, and judicial branches; and the work
of government is shared by a host of independent administrative agen-
cies and departments within the executive branch. The personnel con-
nected with these offices and agencies are responsible for administering
different federal statutes, and, quite naturally, develop differing views
on legal and policy issues.
Congress placed the Office of the Solicitor General near the hub of
this complex scheme of government. It created the office in 1870, at the
same time it created the Department of Justice, as part of an overall
effort to centralize control over federal litigation. Congress had high
ambitions for the Office and set a lofty standard for its future incum-
bents by stating in the Committee Report: "We propose to have a man
of sufficient learning, ability, and experience that he can be sent...
into any court wherever the Government has an interest in litigation,
and there present the case of the United States as it should be
presented." 2
Before considering how the Solicitor General attempts to "present
the case of the United States as it should be presented," I would like to
give you a bird's eye view of the work load of the Office as it operates
today.
The Solicitor General, with the assistance of a staff of 20 attorneys, is
responsible for conducting and supervising all aspects of government
litigation in the Supreme Court of the United States. If the government
wins in the lower court, he normally defends that victory in the
Supreme Court. If the government loses in the lower court, he must
decide whether or not to seek Supreme Court review by petitioning for
a writ of certiorari or taking an appeal. In either situation, he must
decide how the government's position will be presented on the merits
when the Supreme Court decides to hear the case. In addition, the So-
licitor General must review each case in which a district court has ruled
2. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3035 (1870).
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against the United States to determine whether the United States
should take an appeal to the appropriate court of appeals. He performs
the same role in the relatively few cases in which the United States or
one of its officers is a party to litigation in the state courts. He also
must decide whether the United States should file a brief as amicus
curiae in any appellate court-state or federal-and must decide what
position that brief will take. A significant part of the appellate work of
the office involves government agencies that have conducted lower
court litigation by themselves, such as the National Labor Relations
Board and the Securities and Exchange Commission. Many cases also
arise from the activities of executive departments of the government.
In addition to this appellate practice, the Solicitor General also is
responsible for an unusual form of trial litigation-litigation on the
Supreme Court's original docket. Original cases are cases commenced
in the Supreme court; cases that have never been before a lower court.
The most important of these are controversies between two or more
states (in which the United States frequently intervenes), and contro-
versies between the United States and one or more of the states. You
may wonder how a busy appellate court such as the Supreme Court
disposes of these original matters, many of which take several years,
and some of which take several decades, to resolve. In the more lei-
surely days of the eighteenth century, original cases actually were tried
before a jury in the Supreme Court. For example, in Georgia v. Brails-
ford' the Supreme Court empanelled a special jury, counsel argued to
the jury for four days, and Chief Justice Jay delivered the charge to the
jury. Bowing to the practicalities of its present case load, the Supreme
Court today delegates the resolution of factual issues in original cases
to a special master, before whom the Solicitor General and his staff
appear as if in a trial court.
The volume of work in the Solicitor General's Office is startling,
even to attorneys accustomed to the rapid pace of private practice and
judges who are accustomed to the crowded dockets of the federal
courts. During the past Term of the Supreme Court (July 1979 to July
1980), the Solicitor General's Office handled 2,023 cases in the
Supreme Court. We filed sixty-seven petitions for writs of certiorari,
and participated in argument or filed briefs on the merits in 108 cases
considered by the Court. During this same one year period, there were
3. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
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426 cases in which the Solicitor General decided not to petition for
certiorari, and 1,517 cases in which the Solicitor General was called
upon to decide whether or not to take an appeal to one of the federal
courts of appeals.
During this one year time period, the Solicitor General, with the help
of a small staff of attorneys, was called on to handle a total of 4,219
substantive matters. The subjects, of course, were as varied as the ac-
tivities of the federal government. The litigation ranged from Indian
treaties to antitrust, from bank robberies to air pollution, and from job
discrimination to endangered wildlife species.
In a substantial number of these cases the legal and policy issues cut
across the jurisdictional lines of several different government offices.
Attorneys in different government offices held diverse views on the im-
portance of particular cases, the need to pursue further review, the po-
sition that should be taken, and the legal analysis that should be
presented to the court of appeals or the Supreme Court.
II. THE OCCASIONS FOR DISAGREEMENT
Let me now turn to some of the specific situations in which the Solic-
itor General's Office is called upon to ascertain "the interests of the
United States" and to resolve conflicting claims among different gov-
ernment offices.
A. The Decision to Take an 4ppeal, Petition for Rehearing En Banc,
or to Petition for Certiorari
A perennial source of disagreement among government lawyers is
the decision whether or not to pursue further review after the govern-
ment suffers an adverse ruling in a lower court. The Solicitor General
must decide whether it is appropriate to take an appeal from the district
court, petition a court of appeals for rehearing en banc, or petition the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Our standards in making these
decisions are more stringent as cases reach the higher levels of the ap-
pellate system. A case ordinarily will be appealed if it has substantial
importance to the government and if the government's legal position
has a reasonable basis. We do not, however, petition the Supreme
Court to review adverse decisions unless the case satisfies the stricter
standards of exceptional importance applied by the Supreme Court it-
self. This usually means that we look for cases involving conflicts
[Vol. 59:337
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among the circuits or cases involving constitutional or statutory issues
of substantial and continuing importance to the enforcement of the
law. In addition, we inquire to determine whether the factual record
and procedural posture of the case are appropriate to test the legal
question in a plenary hearing before the Supreme Court.
Naturally, a government agency or department that loses a case
tends to view it as a matter of utmost urgency. But it is the duty of the
Solicitor General to serve as a first-line gatekeeper for the Supreme
Court and to say "no" to many government officials who present plau-
sible claims of legal error in the lower courts. Our duty to the Court,
and our need to preserve credibility when we advise the Court that a
case is "cert. worthy," requires rejection of many such proposals for
certiorari.
B. The Decision to Take a Particular Position as Amicus Curiae
Disagreements among government officials also arise when the Solic-
itor General is called upon to participate as amicus curiae in a given
case. The suggestion that an amicus brief be filed may come from one
or more of the parties, or from one or more government agencies. Not
infrequently, federal officials will urge differing, even opposite, posi-
tions. Sometimes, the solution is to file nothing. More often, however,
the government's interests in the outcome are too important to be left
unspoken and a decision must be made to advocate a particular posi-
tion. That is also the situation when the Supreme Court "invites" the
Solicitor General to "state the views of the United States," as happens
several dozen times each Term. Then we have no choice except to de-
cide which "views" should be put forward.
In National Gerimedical Hospital v. Blue Cross of Kansas City4 the
Eighth Circuit held that the National Health Planning and Resources
Development Act created an implied exemption from the federal anti-
trust laws. The Antitrust Division took the position that the case was
wrongly decided and that it confficted with a series of published busi-
ness review letters. The Department of Health and Human Services,
however, initially was of the view that the decision was correct and
should be supported. Through a continuing course of meetings with
both agencies, we were able to minimize the differences that existed
and to arrive at a position that accommodates the concerns of both
4. 628 F.2d 1050 (1980).
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interested parties. Our amicus curiae brief contends that an implied
exemption is not called for by the facts of the particular case before the
Court, but acknowledges that an implied exemption may be necessary
in other situations to make the National Health Planning Act work as
contemplated by Congress.
C. The Decision to Confess Error in a Criminal Case
One of the most difficult decisions for any Solicitor General is the
decision whether or not to confess error in a case-almost always a
criminal case-after the United States Attorney has obtained a
favorable judgment and a federal court of appeals has affirmed that
judgment. This issue arises in rare situations in which the Criminal
Division of the Department of Justice, or a member of the Solicitor
General's staff, discovers some fundamental error, or some departure
from Department of Justice standards, which necessitates a reversal of
the conviction. The Supreme Court has prompted the government in
the following terms: "The public trust reposed in the law enforcement
officers of the Government requires that they be quick to confess error
when, in their opinion, a miscarriage of justice may result from their
remaining silent."5 The Solicitor General has not hesitated to confess
error when the method of jury selection was clearly unfair,6 when the
jury instructions were plainly erroneous and prejudicial,7 when the
conviction was unsupported by evidence,8 when an unlawful sentence
was imposed,9 or when the defendant's conviction was sustained on a
legal theory in conflict with a decision of the Supreme Court.'0
I do not mean to suggest from these examples that the decision to
confess error is one to be made lightly. To the contrary, such a decision
requires much soul-searching and is to be rendered as a last resort since
it is the obligation of the government's lawyer to urge all reasonable
arguments in support of a favorable judgment. The United States At-
5. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258 (1942).
6. Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544 (1964). In Leonard the trial judge selected a
panel of jurors from a group of people who had, only moments earlier, heard another jury pro-
nounce the defendant guilty in a closely related case. The brief filed by the United States not only
conceded error but also stated that jurors exposed to such a prejudicial event "should be automati-
cally disqualified from serving at the second trial if an objection is raised at the outset." Id. at 545.
7. Chaifetz v. United States, 366 U.S. 209 (1961).
8. Bates v. United States, 323 U.S. 15 (1944).
9. Grabina v. United States, 369 U.S. 426 (1962).
10. Mariscal v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 909 (1981) (per curiam).
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tomey, who has tried the case and has persuaded the court of appeals
to uphold the conviction, understandably takes a dim view of confes-
sions of error in the Supreme Court. Moreover the Justices ordinarily
benefit from hearing the strongest argument that can be made on each
side of a case. Confessions of error by the Solicitor General also gener-
ate tensions with lower court judges who have been persuaded by the
government to affirm a conviction. Judge Simon Sobeloff, a former So-
licitor General, is quoted as saying "When I was Solicitor General, I
thought that confessing error was the noblest function of the office.
Now that I am a circuit judge, I know it is the lowest trick one lawyer
can play on another."'" On this subject, Learned Hand commented
with characteristic directness: "It is bad enough to have the Supreme
court reverse you, but I will be damned if I will be reversed by some
Solicitor General." As a former Circuit Judge who has had first hand
experience with confessions of error in the Supreme Court, I naturally
sympathize with these views. Nonetheless, a long tradition in the Solic-
itor General's Office supports confessions of error when required by the
public interest. Robert Stern observed: "Every Solicitor General for
years-I am told since at least 1890-has been willing to concede the
government was wrong when he was convinced of that fact.' 2 This
practice is consistent with the words of Solicitor General Lehman,
which today are inscribed on the rotunda near the Attorney General's
Office: "The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its
citizens in Court." Or, in the words of the Supreme Court itself, the
"interest [of the national sovereign] is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done."'' 3
D. The Decision Not to Defend the Constitutionality of a Statutory
Provision
Perhaps the most sensitive decision for a Solicitor General is the de-
cision not to defend the constitutionality of a statute enacted by Con-
gress and signed by the President, or to affirmatively contest the
constitutionality of a statutory provision as an amicus curiae in the
Supreme Court. In such cases, the Solicitor General's Office is called
upon to give full faith and credit to the fundamental law embodied in
11. Cox, The Government In The Supreme Court, 44 CH. B. REc. 221, 225 (1963).
12. Stem, The Solicitor General's Office andAdministrativeAgency Litigation, 46 A.B.A.J. 154,
158 (1960).
13. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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the Constitution, even at the expense of the federal statute. In Cooper v.
Calfano 14 the district court enjoined discriminatory gender-based dis-
tribution of death and disability benefits to spouses of wage earners.
The gist of the complaint in that case was that Section 202 of the Social
Security Act provided benefits for female spouses, but denied those
same benefits to male spouses in identical circumstances. The Supreme
Court's recent unanimous decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld" held
that such gender-based discriminations under the Social Security Act
violated the Fifth Amendment. In light of that recent authoritative
pronouncement from the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General decided
to notify Congress that the district court's decision would not be ap-
pealed.
Congress has established a statutory mechanism 6 that requires the
Department of Justice to advise it of a decision not to defend the con-
stitutionality of federal statutory provisions challenged in the courts.
This procedure permits Congress to designate a representative, if it so
chooses, to defend the statute. There is precedent for congressional
participation in the Supreme Court to defend statutory provisions that
the Solicitor General deems to be in contravention of the Constitu-
tion. 17
III. THE QUEST FOR THE INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES
Congress has charged the Solicitor General with the duty to "attend
to the interests of the United States."'" In view of the large volume of
litigation that he handles, and the many occasions for disagreement
among interested government officials, how does the Solicitor General
perform that task? As any sophisticated observer will quickly recog-
nize, the task cannot be performed by trying to identify a particular
official or office as "the client," for, as my predecessor Francis Biddle
14. 81 F.R.D. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
15. 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
16. Department of Justice Appropriation Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1979, Pub. L. No.
95-624, § 13, 92 Stat. 3459 (1979).
17. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 65-77 (1926), in which Senator George
Wharton Pepper argued the position of Congress at the bar of the Supreme Court and disagreed
with the position of the Solicitor General. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), in which
several members of Congress submitted amicus curiae briefs supporting the constitutionality of a
statutory provision challenged in the Solicitor General's amicus curiae brief.
18. See note I supra.
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correctly stated: "The client is but an abstraction." 9 Certainly not
even the hardiest platonist would hope to discover the "interest of the
United States" by speculative effort alone. In fact, the "interest of the
United States" is best understood in functional terms-as the end-
product of a dynamic process of decision-making involving many par-
ticipants. That process operates within the framework of a body of
procedures and standards that have the sanction of long tradition in the
Solicitor General's Office. It is a process of sorting and sifting, listening
and debating, compromising and holding firm-but always discussing.
This is the crucible from which the position of the United States is
distilled in controversial cases, and it contributes to a sound, critically
examined presentation in the Supreme Court.
The following is a summary of the procedures that we observe before
formulating a legal position. The first, and perhaps most important,
procedural rule is to give all interested government officials a fair hear-
ing. We receive written submissions from them, permit them to chal-
lenge opposing views, and meet with them in person to iron out
differences that can be resolved. As our court papers are drafted, we
continue to consult with interested agencies and attempt to accommo-
date their concerns.
A second essential rule followed by the Solicitor General's Office is
to avoid any appearance of formulating "policy" for the agencies. As
former Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has observed, the Depart-
ment of Justice is not "a super-agency ratifying or vetoing determina-
tions made by other departments or agencies--Congress has committed
elsewhere the primary responsibility for most of the policy decisions
which steer the engine of government." 2 Our customary business is to
ascertain the meaning of statutes, deferring to reasonable agency inter-
pretations, and to assess the importance of particular cases with the
help of our client agencies and departments.
A third principle is that we are equally exacting in dealing with all
government offices that request extraordinary review through a petition
for a writ of certiorari. All agencies of government share a long term
interest in preserving the credibility of the Solicitor General's Office in
the Supreme Court. We want the Justices to continue to assume that
we will not seek their review unless the issues in the case are ready for,
19. F. BIDDLE, IN BIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962).
20. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests of the United
States before the Supreme Court, 34 Mo. L. REv. 527, 528 (1969).
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and are worthy of, the Court's consideration. As Robert Stem pointed
out:
[S]elf restraint in petitioning for certiorari [gives] the Court confidence in
Goverment petitions. It is hoped and believed. . . that the Court will
realize that the Solicitor General will not assert that an issue is of general
importance unless it is-and that confidence in the Solicitor General's
attempt to adhere to the Court's own standards will cause the Court to
grant more government petitions.21
Our efforts in this direction have borne fruit. Although the Court
granted only six percent of the private petitions for certiorari filed last
Term, it granted eighty percent of the government's petitions.
A final procedural principle is that when the discussion process is
over and well-grounded differences of opinion on the merits of a legal
issue remain, the Solicitor General will attempt to convey both points
of view to the Court. This may be done by filing a brief that sets forth
both points of view, or, very rarely, by permitting an agency to file a
brief or petition of its own that is authorized by the Solicitor General
but not endorsed by him. This, I should stress, is a measure of last
resort. The Supreme Court normally expects us to reconcile the dispa-
rate views of the government and to speak with one voice. That is,
after all, why we have a Solicitor General.
In addition to adhering to these procedures, we attempt to abide by
certain substantive requirements that have been part of the tradition of
the Solicitor General's Office for many years. We guide our delibera-
tions by fundamental legal mandates-the Constitution, statutes en-
acted by Congress, and decisions of the Supreme Court. Beyond this,
we are guided by the practical requirements of uniformity in our
presentations to the federal courts at all levels, regardless of our litigat-
ing role as plaintiff or defendant in a particular case. Finally, and per-
haps most importantly, we try to fix our eye on the overall public
interest when formulating the position of the United States in a particu-
lar case. This does not mean that the Solicitor General is an
ombudsman with a roving commission to do justice as he sees it. It
does mean, however, that he must try to place each case in context,
viewing it as part of a continuing litigation process and recognizing its
significance outside of the halls of government. My predecessor, Erwin
Griswold, has well described the Solicitor General's focus on the public
interest in the following terms:
21. Stem, supra note 12, at 156.
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The unique opportunity to be statesman-like while, still being a lawyer,
comes from the recognition that our immediate client, the United States
government and its agencies, owes responsibility to all the people of this
Nation who have determined that they will live under a constitutional
regime where the Rule of Law binds all.
22
Statesmanship of this kind, as Dean Griswold notes, requires the gov-
ernment's advocate to "recognize the larger interests at stake, interests
which may warrant conceding a momentary advantage that would ulti-
mately distort or retard the achievement of a greater goal."
23
22. Griswold, supra note 20, at 527-28.
23. Id.
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